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should be long past the time when we be-
lieve that passing a law or adding a family
living class to the curriculum will solve most
major marriage problems. . .. "',0
The majority of school administrators
today favor a policy allowing married
youths to continue their schooling. In a
nationwide survey among school super-
intendents, 41 seventy-eight per cent of those
polled, although not endorsing the idea of
high school marriages, believed that mar-
ried students should be permitted to stay in
school. One superintendent said: "Our pres-
ent policy allows married students to con-
tinue their education. To date we have not
been even slightly embarrassed."' ' A great
majority also denounced any segregation of
married students - seventy-eight per cent
believed that they should not be separated
from the unmarried students in extra-cur-
", Kerchoff & Rimel, sapra note 36, at 562,







The practice of artificial insemination
wherein the woman is impregnated with the
semen of someone other than her husband t
[hereinafter referred to as AID] is not a new
I In addition to heterologous insemination (AID),
homologous insemination (AIH) is also widely
practiced. AIH constitutes the impregnation of a
9 CATiOLIc LAWYER, AUTUMN 1963
ricular activities and ninety-three per cent
said there should be no segregation at
lunchtime.4
3
Litigation in the area of married high
school students is usually initiated by vic-
tims of allegedly unreasonable and arbitrary
regulations. The trend today is not only to
liberalize existing regulations, 44 but to finally
eliminate all special regulation of married
students. This development should lead to
the disappearance of all litigation in this
area.
43 Ibid.
,1- An example of the current policy in Rock
Island, Illinois is presented by Dr. Hanson, Super-
intendent of Schools, in NEA J., Sept. 1961, p. 26.
"Marital Status: High school marriages are not
socially or economically defensible. Hence, the
deans and other personnel will counsel students
against contracting them even though marriage
does not bar attendance. In the event of preg-
nancy, the student will be dropped unless she is
a senior in the last 6 weeks of the school year, in
which case she will be denied the privilege of
attendance but granted permission to study at
home, present her work to the school, and if sat-
isfactory, be granted a passing grade."
concept.2 Its increasing use among childless
married couples, :' which has resulted in a
female with her husband's semen as opposed to
the seed of a third party donor. See Vecchi, Artifi-
cial Insemination and Legitimacy in Pennsylvania,
66 DIcK. L. REV. 1, 2 (1961).
- The Arabs employed artificial insemination as
early as the fourteenth century in the breeding of
mares. The first successful human insemination
was accomplished by Eustachius in the sixteenth
century. Koerner, Medico-legal Considerations in
Artificial Insemination, 8 LA. L. REV. 484, 487
(1948).
LoGatto, Artificial Insemination: I Legal As-
pects, 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 172, 173 (1955).
RECENT DECISIONS
large number of such children conceived by
this method," poses a number of legal ques-
tions. One of the most significant problems
presented by the growth of AID concerns
the legitimacy of resulting offspring, since
the rights of paternal support and inherit-
ance are involved.
In a recent annulment action, the evi-
dence disclosed that the wife had submitted
to AID with her husband's written consent
and as a result had given birth to a child. In
granting a decree of annulment the New
York Supreme Court held that a child con-
ceived through AID with the consent of its
mother's husband is not the legitimate off-
spring of the husband, but as he consented
to the insemination, he should be estopped
from denying the child financial support.
Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242
N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
The first reported English case on this
subject was L. v. L. where the wife sought
to have her marriage annulled on the
grounds of non-consumation due to her
husband's psychological impotency. After
granting the decree of nullity, the court
concluded that the wife's child conceived
through homologous insemination was ille-
gitimate. As a matter of policy, the court
concluded, "that the child should be made
illegitimate is most regrettable ... sons are
not judged by the error of their parents. ' '6
This approach was followed in the case
of Doornbos v. Doornbos,7 wherein the
.1 Between 1941 and 1955 there was a population
increase of 40,000 children born through artificial
insemination of which 10,000 live in New York
City. LoGatto, Artificial Insemination: I Legal
Aspects, supra note 3, at 173.
5 [1949] 1 All E.R. 141.
, L. v. L., supra note 5, at 146.
7 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2308 (111. Super. Ct. Dec. 13,
1954).
court vigorously denounced the practice of
AID as against "public policy and good
morals... ."I' It held that a child so con-
ceived should be considered born out of
wedlock and therefore illegitimate; thus the
husband should have no right or interest in
the child.
Confronted with a similar problem the
New York Supreme Court reached the op-
posite conclusion. In Strnad v. Strnad,9 the
child had been begotten through AID with
the husband's consent while the parties were
still married. After being separated by judi-
cial decree, the wife petitioned the court to
determine the husband's visitation rights to
the child. The court found the husband a fit
guardian and indicated that the interests of
the child might best be served by his reason-
able periodic visits.
But the court did not stop there; it at-
tempted to vindicate its position concerning
the visitation rights by finding that the child
should be considered the husband's legiti-
mate offspring. Establishing legitimacy in
terms of adoption, the court held that the
child was "semi-adopted" or "potentially
adopted" by the husband.
Relying on Section 24 of the New York
Domestic Relations Law, which provides
that an illegitimate child will be legitimatized
upon the subsequent marriage of its natural
parents, the court stated that, "logically and
8 Ibid. AID has been condemned as against public
policy in a number of jurisdictions. The court con-
sidered it adultery in Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R.
251 (1921), and in Russell v. Russell, [1924] A.C.
687. Contra, Hoch v. Hoch, unreported case, Cir.
Ct. Cook Co. I1. (1945), referred to in Chicago
Sun (Feb. 10, 1945); Maclennon v. Maclennon,
[1958] Scots L.T.R. 12. The latter two cases did
not consider that the traditional definition of
adultery applied to AID, since there was no cor-
poral connection.
9 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (SLIp. Ct. 1948).
realistically, the situation is no different than
that pertaining in the case of a child born
out of wedlock who by law is made legiti-
mate upon the marriage of the interested
parties."
Realizing the possible far-reaching results
of its decision, the court refused to pass on
property rights stating that it "was not con-
cerned with them in this particular case." '11
In the principal case the court attempted
to employ "reason and logic," in order to
effect "a proper and just adjudication." It
began by defining the concept of illegiti-
macy. By statute12 and case law13 an il-
legitimate child has been defined as a child
begotten and born out of wedlock or out
of lawful matrimony. The court reasoned
that "illegitimate," "bastfrd" and "natural"
child refer to the status of a child whose
natural father is not his mother's husband.14
Employing this concept of illegitimacy it
held that a child conceived through AID
must be considered illegitimate since the
husband could not have been the child's
natural father even though he was the spouse
of its mother.
The court expended a major portion of its
opinion in criticizing the rationale of the
Strnad case." It cited to Section 110 of the
Domestic Relations Law which expressly
provides that adoption is a legal and judicial
I0 Id. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
' Ibid.
-N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT §512.
1 Comm'r of Pub. Welfare v. Koehler, 284 N.Y.
260, 264, 30 N.E.2d 587, 589 (1940).
" For a profitable discussion of this point see
SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS §2
(3d ed. 1953).
"5 A good critique of the Strnad case may be found
in LoGatto, Artificial Insemination: I Legal As-
pects, 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 172, 177-79 (1955)
and in Schlemer, Artificial Insemination and the
Law, 32 MICH. STATE BAR J. 44 (1953).
9 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1963
proceeding, and that "no person shall here-
after be adopted except in pursuance of this
article." Thus in New York the process of
adoption is judicial in character, and the
husband's consent of itself would not render
the child his legitimate offspring. The court,
therefore, held that in no sense could a child
be labeled as "semi-adopted" or "potentially
adopted." Moreover, it reasoned that
Strnad's solution of the problem of legiti-
macy through a theory of implied adoption
constituted a tacit recognition that the child
would otherwise have been illegitimate. The
court rejected Strnad's application of Sec-
tion 24 of the Domestic Relations Law be-
cause that statute operates to legitimatize
a child only when its biological parents
later intermarry.' This was not the case
in Strnad, for the child's natural father, the
donor, did not marry its mother as to bring
it within the scope of this statute.
As in Strnad, the court in Gursky did not
expressly pass on property rights. Yet under
the circumstances it was hesitant to leave
the child without future provision for sup-
port. It reasoned that the husband by his
consent had induced the wife to undergo the
artificial insemination and for that reason
she detrimentally altered her position. Con-
sequently the court concluded that it would
be unconscionable for the husband to escape
the burden of supporting the child. It there-
fore invoked the doctrine of equitable estop-
pel, placing upon him the responsibility of
the child's support.17
16 See also Rice, A.I.D.-An Heir of Controversy,
34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 510, 517 (1959).
17 The court also found an implied contract and
stated that "the husband's written consent to the
procedure implied a promise on his part to furnish
support for any offspring resulting from the in-
semination."
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It is clear then that two divergent and
apparently contradictory views with regard
to the legitimacy of AID children have been
introduced in New York. The Strnad hold-
ing is in accord with the general tendency of
courts to find legitimacy. Such a finding
does not socially stigmatize the child and
enables him to take full advantage of inher-
itance rights. On the other hand, the Gursky
holding, while it appears to be the more
correct application of the law, results in
harsh consequences with respect to inherit-
ancy. An illegitimate child cannot inherit
from his father,"8 but can inherit from his
mother provided she leave no legitimate
issue. 19 Moreover, the illegitimate cannot
inherit from any of her relatives.2 0
Aside from the question of inheritance
rights, the problem of support of the child
also arises in this area. Section 513 of the
New York Family Court Act provides that
the natural parents of a child born out of
wedlock are liable for the support of the
child. Following the rationale of Gursky,
however, the natural father of an AID child
is the donor. But to hold liable the donor
for the support of the child would be in-
congruous since the purpose of AID is to
furnish barren couples with offspring. On
the other hand, it is undisputed that the
husband of a woman who bears an ilegiti-
mate child during marriage has neither a
moral" nor legal obligation for the child's
support. -'
18 It re Vincent's Estate, 189 Misc. 489, 71 N.Y.S.
2d 165 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
11 N. Y. DECED. EST. LAW §83 (13); In re Cady,
257 App. Div. 129, 12 N.Y.S.2d 750, aff'd men.,
281 N.Y. 688, 23 N.E.2d 18 (1939).
'0li re Simpson's Estate, 175 Misc. 718, 24
N.Y.S.2d 954 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
21 "The husband of the wife inseminated in AID
has no natural moral obligation towards the do-
nated child .... He may, of course, if he wishes,
The perplexities overshadowing this area
have not gone unnoticed. Bills seeking to
legitimatize these children have been intro-
duced in six states": but none have passed.
Typical of this proposed legislation was the
bill introduced in the New York State
Senate in 1948. It provided that "a child
born to a married woman by means of arti-
ficial insemination with the consent of her
husband shall be deemed the legitimate nat-
ural child of both the husband and his wife
for all purposes .... 24
English jurists have also considered the
problems presented by AID. In a memor-
andum prepared by the Council of the Law
Society delivered to the Department Com-
mittee on Artificial Insemination the follow-
ing was recommended:
As regards parental rights and duties a child
conceived with the consent of the husband,
during the lifetime of the husband, should
be in the same position as one who is
legitimate....
Any doubts there may be under present law
as to the legitimacy of a child conceived
with the husband's consent ... through AID
... should be removed by legislation. 2"
take on the obligation of caring for the child, but
that is not an obligation of natural justice .. "
DAVIS, ARTIFICIAL HUMAN FECUNDATION 15
(1951).
" Collins v. Collins, 195 Misc. 119, 89 N.Y.S.2d
252 (Dom. Re]. Ct. 1949).
2:1 Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, New York, Vir-
ginia and Wisconsin. See Levinsohn, Dilemma in
Parenthood: Socio- Legal Aspects of Artificial
Human Insemination, 36 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1, 29
(1959).
'2 Sen. No. 758, 2,048, Int. 745 (1948). A Vir-
ginia proposal was very similar. "Children born as
a result of artificial insemination shall be consid-
ered the same as legitimate children for all pur-
poses, if the husband of the mother consented to
the operation." S 745 GA Sess. (1948).
2; Memorandum, The Legal Implications of Arti-
ficial Insemination, 56 LAW Soc. GAZ. 529, 531
(1959).
None of the proposals has been enacted
into law. Each requires the husband's con-
sent as the sine qua non for the child's legiti-
mazation. This view has created consider-
able discussion and invoked much criticism.
The fact that the husband has freely con-
sented to the artificial insemination does not
have a bearing on the question of the child's
legitimacy. If it did, by similar reasoning it
might be urged that the fact that a husband
had consented to the commission of adultery
by his wife would legitimatize the issue re-
sulting from the adulterous connection.29
The court in Gursky noted that the legis-
lature has declined to modify the historical
concept of illegitimacy when confronted
with the problem of AID.2 1 It concluded
that, "this is another indication of the dis-
26 SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS
§2 (3d ed. 1953); see also Holloway, Artificial
Insemination: An Examination of the Legal As-
pects, 43 A.B.A.J. 1089, 1155 (1957).
27 While no bill has passed legitimatizing AID
conceived children, New York City has enacted
an ordinance regulating the donation and distribu-
tion of semen. This regulation, while not expressly
approving of the practice, tacitly condones it. By
9 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1963
inclination on the part of the legislature to
disturb the application of the historical con-
cept of illegitimacy to children begotten
through heterologous artificial insemina-
tion." ' This unwillingness is grounded upon
the theory that the practice is against public
policy and good morals. The court also re-
ferred to the Doornbos opinion where AID
was found to constitute adultery and for
that reason held to be against public policy. 29
This would also seem to be the implica-
tion of the Gursky holding. Since this is the
predominant view in New York and in the
other jurisdictions where this question has
been passed upon, it would not be unlikely
that any bill seeking to legitimatize AID
children would be met by strong opposition.
requiring standards with which donors are to be
selected and records kept, it has attempted to cur-
tail irregularities that might possibly result from
the misuse of artificial insemination. N.Y.C.
HEALTH CODE §§21.01-21.07.
1s Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 1087, 242
N.Y.S.2d 406, 410 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
2-" Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2308
(111. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 1954).
